Various models of explanation have been utilized to elaborate greater understanding of how
Russia’s Armed Forces were used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These models often fail to reflect
Russian military culture, operational strategy, doctrine, tactics and military art. The following paper
analyses in detail, drawing upon the author’s extensive expertise on the Russian Armed Forces and his
assessment of open source reporting on the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s use of military power in two
very different operational environments: in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine.
The author assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Russian and Ukrainian forces locally
in Crimea on the eve of conflict; describes why the operation was so successful; sets out the case that
the operational environment and Russia’s conventional force weaknesses were key drivers in how
operations were conducted in these different theaters; concludes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces
with less combat training and combined-arms exercise experience than their Russian counterparts
were stymied in southeastern Ukraine using relatively low numbers of Russian inserted forces
alongside rebel forces; while most focus has been on Russian combat roles in Donbas their primary
mission has been to train and equip local rebel forces—modeled on the organizational structure of the
Russian Armed Forces (brigade-based with battalion tactical groups deployed to conduct manoeuvre
warfare against Ukrainian battalions). This study also concludes that while Moscow has retained
control over conflict escalation during the conflict, its relatively low-scale use of regular forces and
Special Forces reflects Russia’s limited conventional military power and its leadership’s anxiety to
avoid being drawn into a larger-scale commitment to an open ended conflict.